Here is the first fault line.

The Chinese party-state is a project from above.  The PRC sees its legitimacy as coming from a mandate of history, just as the dynastic mandate come from heaven.  Virtually everything political in China is state-driven – little gains entry from below.  The high interests of the state eclipse the low priority of citizen rights. 

1. Many Chinese people still practice obedience, loyalty, and filial piety, and some even continue to fear foreign influence.  After 60 years of Communist rule, spearheaded by the red emperors, many Chinese people still heed dictators in the guise of parents, still regard the West as anti-China, still look upon Asia as China's backyard. 
2. The religion of the Chinese is China itself.  The religion of the Chinese, in the absence of a pervasive transcendental religion, and in the presence of a party-state controlling virtually all information channels (and increasingly the Internet), and propping itself up by bribes to the nation, maybe be said to be China itself.
3. China's tremendous size makes it difficult to rule. Large areas of China are under the influence of local gangs and thugs, ruling according to private interest.  Many village-level areas are lawless, ruled by different groups - and largely out of the reach of the central authorities. The 60th anniversary heightens sensitivities about internal stability, and the riots in Xinjiang in early July 2009 have made the PRC and CCP even more nervous.  Often functionaries from government departments and China's Communist Party are connected in Mafia-style networks with businessmen, security forces or even criminal gangs. Some worry about the prospect of a regime change (even a “color revolution”), resulting in the CCP being ejected from office.  Increasingly the CCP has less control of large areas of the rapidly morphing China. 
   
4. Leading CCP ideologues argue that a western-style democratic parliamentary model will exacerbate the mounting social and intellectual challenges facing the party-state.  They fear that Western style elections would create instability; impede China's development at a critical juncture; and, risk the release of divisive political forces in a complex society already stretched to the limits in terms of regional and class inequalities.  Maybe they are right, but maybe they only fear losing their place in the status quo. 
   
5. Only the repressive regime in Beijing keeps country from flying apart.  China would likely cease to exist as a nation, if it had a US-style democracy, and Chinese history shows that centralized rule has proved more stable than the feeble attempts at democracy in China.  Nonetheless, does that leave open the possiblity of a planned and thoughtful attempt at democracy?